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Abstract: This study examines the role of  moral reasoning in strengthening the effects of  the 
working relationship and incentive schemes on the likelihood of  reporting accounting fraud. 
This study predicts that higher moral reasoning, or being exposed to incentive schemes, is more 
likely to cause someone to be a whistleblower. However, individuals with a close working rela-
tionship with wrongdoers will exhibit a lower propensity to blow the whistle than those with no 
close working relationship. Finally, moral reasoning is expected to interact with working relation-
ships and incentive schemes to affect the propensity to blow the whistle. Based on a lab experi-
ment with 147 participants, this study documents that the simple effect of  moral reasoning, the 
working relationship, or an incentive scheme are (marginally) significant. Similarly, the combi-
nation of  moral reasoning and the working relationship significantly improves the tendency to 
blow the whistle. However, the combined effects of  moral reasoning vs. the working relationship 
and moral reasoning vs. the working relationship vs. an incentive scheme are not significant. This 
paper confirms previous studies which found that moral reasoning significantly alters the whis-
tleblowing intention but that the impact of  moral reasoning is not robust for incentive schemes 
and working relationships. Some limitations should be considered, namely the textual scenarios 
of  the experimental design, working experience, and the omission of  personal orientation and 
the personal cost of  reporting.
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Introduction
Whistleblowing has been a subject of  
growing interest for scholars and the general 
public, and even more so when a series of  
frauds and financial scandals, in both glob-
al and local financial services, populate the 
news (Brooks, 2018, The Jakarta Post, 2018a, 
The Jakarta Post, 2018b). Markedly since the 
call from Miceli et al., (2008), studies have in-
vestigated whistleblowing in various contexts 
outside of  the U.S., such as in, among oth-
ers, Indonesia (Latan et al., 2018;  Latan et 
al., 2019a and 2019b), Australia (Fieger and 
Rice, 2018), New Zealand (Liyanarachchi 
and Newdick, 2009), Norway (Skivenes and 
Trygstad, 2010), Germany (Lee et al., 2018), 
Turkey (Erkmen et al., 2014), and Singapore 
(Boo et al., 2016).
Among the extant literature that mea-
sures the whistleblowing intention, mixed ev-
idence is available; firstly, whether moral de-
velopment plays a significant role in reporting 
wrongdoing. Cheng et al., (2019) found the 
role of  moral courage in moderating the rela-
tionship between organizational politics and 
internal whistleblowing intentions. Similarly, 
Dungan et al., (2019) show that moral rea-
soning consistently predicts whistleblowing 
decisions across contexts, but it is not robust 
to the loyalty concern. Doe et al., (2020) and 
May-Amy et al., (2020) document the signifi-
cant main effect of  normative beliefs and the 
combined effect of  normative beliefs and re-
ward motivation on the intention to blow the 
whistle. However, they indicate that the main 
effect of  punishment motivation does not 
significantly affect whistleblowing intentions.
Furthermore, Latan et al., (2018) and 
Latan et al., (2019a) provide partial sup-
port for the relationships between perceived 
moral intensity and whistleblowing. They 
find significant direct effects but insignificant 
moderating effects. Finally, Pangestu and Ra-
hajeng (2020) find insignificant direct sup-
port for the moral intensity to whistleblow.
Secondly, if  organizational-level in-
centive schemes effectively affect the whis-
tleblowing intention. Lee et al., (2018) in-
dicate that the whistleblowing intention of  
U.S. accountants is lowest in the absence of  
anti-retaliation protection and monetary re-
wards, but it is highest for German accoun-
tants. Latan et al., (2019b) documented that 
financial incentives strongly support the in-
ternal, external, and anonymous whistleblow-
ing intentions. Furthermore, Andon et al., 
(2018) found direct support for financial in-
centives affecting whistleblowing intentions. 
However, when the wrongdoing is severe, 
the effect of  any financial incentive is weak, 
and vice versa. Similarly, Rose et al., (2018) 
indicate a partial relationship between mone-
tary rewards and reporting fraud. The results 
of  their experiment suggest that monetary 
rewards affect reporting intentions differ-
ently, depending upon their compensation 
structures; the effect is not significant with 
unrestricted stock compensation but signif-
icant with restricted stock compensation. 
Doe et al., (2020) document that rewards and 
punishment have no direct effect on whis-
tleblowing. However, the interaction between 
rewards and moral beliefs significantly sup-
ports whistleblowing.
Boo et al., (2016) tested the interaction 
effects of  incentive schemes (carrot, stick, 
and control groups) and working relation-
ships (close and not close groups) on audi-
tors’ willingness to report an audit partner’s 
wrongdoing that impairs the quality of  the 
financial reporting in an experimental setting 
with 90 auditors. Including the working re-
lationship variable in their test was very im-
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portant since the nature of  audit work is very 
team-based. They found that auditors with 
reward-based incentive schemes who had 
close cooperative relationships with wrong-
doers were less likely to blow the whistle than 
auditors who did not have a close cooperative 
relationship. Conversely, auditors on penal-
ty-based incentive schemes tended to blow 
the whistle despite the existence of  close 
working relationships.
Furthermore, Boo et al., (2016) iden-
tified that close working relationships with 
wrongdoers significantly reduced the audi-
tor’s tendency to report misconduct when 
there was a reward incentive scheme, but 
this did not occur for incentive schemes with 
penalties or no incentives. Reward and pen-
alty incentive schemes can increase auditors’ 
tendencies to blow the whistle when there 
is no close working relationship; however, a 
reward scheme is less effective than a pen-
alty scheme when there is a close working 
relationship. The inconsistent results of  the 
moderating effect of  incentive schemes on 
the auditors’ propensity to blow the whistle 
might indicate a missing variable, an inherent 
individual factor, namely moral capacity.
Zollo et al., (2017) stated that the tradi-
tional rationalist framework of  ethical deci-
sion-making was challenged by the psycho-
logical and managerial literature, emphasizing 
the importance of  the decision-maker’s cog-
nitive elements, such as intuition and emo-
tion. Based on a social intuitionist perspective, 
they identify that intuition and moral reason-
ing are the ethical decision-making process’s 
antecedents. The ethical decision-making 
framework is a deliberative process that in-
tegrates innate moral intuitive abilities with 
the moral capacity for justifying ethical de-
cision-making. Individual moral capacity is a 
person’s moral reasoning ability or a person’s 
level of  moral maturity, by the ethical values 
that are believed, the stage of  development 
of  the person’s moral abilities, and feelings 
of  moral sensitivity (Schwartz, 2016). Also, 
Schwartz (2016) proposed a model of  ethical 
decision-making by placing moral reasoning 
as a moderating factor, because its role de-
pends on the circumstances at hand.
This study aims to test whether moral 
reasoning plays a significant role in strength-
ening the effects of  a working relationship 
and incentive schemes on the likelihood 
of  reporting accounting fraud. The study 
extends the model by Boo et al., (2016) by 
adding the individual character of  moral rea-
soning into the model. Through an experi-
mental study, individuals’ propensity to blow 
the whistle is modeled as being influenced 
by the level of  moral reasoning’s develop-
ment, incentive schemes, and working rela-
tionships. This study predicts that individuals 
with higher moral reasoning, or who are ex-
posed to incentive schemes, are more likely to 
blow the whistle. However, individuals with a 
close working relationship with wrongdoers 
will exhibit a lower propensity to blow the 
whistle than those with no close working re-
lationship. Finally, the individuals’ moral rea-
soning is expected to interact with working 
relationships and incentive schemes to affect 
the likelihood of  whistleblowing.
Based on a full factorial 2 x 3 experi-
mental design with 147 participants who are 
graduate students in accounting, this study 
indicates that the simple effect of  moral rea-
soning or a close working relationship is sig-
nificant. An incentive scheme is marginally 
significant for increasing the propensity to 
blow the whistle. Similarly, the combination 
of  moral reasoning and the working rela-
tionship significantly improves the tendency 
to blow the whistle. These results are con-
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sistent with previous studies, such as by We-
ber & McGivern (2010), Boo et al., (2016), 
Latan et al., (2018), Pope & Lee (2013), and 
Brink et al., (2013), among others. However, 
the combined effects of  moral reasoning vs. 
the working relationship and moral reason-
ing vs. the working relationship vs. incentive 
schemes fail to increase the tendency to blow 
the whistle. 
The study’s contribution to the audit lit-
erature on accounting fraud and whistleblow-
ing is threefold. First, this paper is the first 
study to test the model of  whistleblowing 
with a single comprehensive model that in-
volves the characteristics of  an individu-
al character’s moral reasoning, motivation 
schemes with rewards and punishment, and 
the nature of  team work in auditing. The 
model captures the essential elements sur-
rounding professional auditors, namely in-
tegrity, incentives, and team work. Second, 
the paper confirms the previous research 
that moral reasoning significantly alters the 
whistleblowing intention, as documented by 
Cheng et al., (2019), Dungan et al., (2019), 
Doe et al., (2020), May-Amy et al., (2020), La-
tan et al., (2018), and Latan et al., (2020). Fi-
nally, the paper documents that the impact of  
moral reasoning on the whistleblowing inten-
tion is not robust, especially when it involves 
incentive schemes and working relationships 
in the joint effects model. Since the “carrot 
vs. stick” incentives could be interpreted as 
opposites, they may reduce the negative and 
moderating effect of  the working relation-
ship (Wang et al., 2018 and Trompeter et al., 
2014). Another plausible reason is that “car-
rot” may impede whistleblowing since it can 
be perceived as harming others for personal 
gain (Boo et al., 2016). Hence there is a can-
celing effect between the “carrot” incentive 
scheme and a close working relationship.
Some limitations should be considered. 
The first is the textual scenarios of  the exper-
imental design may not reflex the complex 
reality and the social interactions of  audit 
work. Second, some of  the participants had 
no work experience, and finally, the omission 
of  other individual-level attributes, such as 
personal orientation (Park et al., 2014) and 
the personal cost of  reporting (Latan et al., 
2018; Latan et al., 2019b; and Schultz et al., 
1993).
The remainder of  this paper is as fol-
lows. The next part presents the literature re-
view, followed by developing the hypotheses, 
the experimental method employed, and the 
results. A discussion, the conclusion, and the 
limitations of  the study end the paper.
Literature Review
Whistleblowing
Whistleblowing happens when one or 
more legitimate members of  an organization 
voluntarily disclose and report a violation 
or fraud that occurs in that organization, to 
initiate some corrective action to resolve it 
(Ceva & Bocchiola, 2018). Whistleblowers 
come from within the organization where 
the facts are reported (Miceli & Near, 1992). 
Whistleblowing is a form of  prosocial be-
havior which is generally defined as the act 
of  reporting wrongdoing to benefit others 
and themselves (Brief  and Motowidlo, 1986, 
Dozier and Miceli, 1985, Miceli and Near, 
1985).
 In contrast to the simple definition of  
“doing good” (Ariely et al., 2009), prosocial 
behavior is a complex, multi-level construct 
with many motives. They are many drivers 
for individuals’ prosocial conduct, such as 
empathy (Eisenberg and Miller, 1987), altru-
ism (Batson and Powell, 2003), and self-iden-
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tity in the light of  social norms (Bénabou and 
Tirole, 2006). They have been of  interest for 
organizational researchers who seek to tap 
into what would affect individuals’ intentions 
to blow the whistle as an act of  prosocial be-
havior, and how its effectiveness can be en-
hanced (Near and Miceli, 1995; Taylor and 
Curtis, 2010; Singh, 2011).
Whistleblowers can report violations 
to the organization’s internal parties, such as 
the whistleblower’s direct supervisor, higher 
management levels, or to the ombudsman’s 
office, as well as to external parties, such as 
the police or the media (Davis, 1996; Del-
mas, 2015). However, the true subjective in-
tentions of  whistleblowers can vary, ranging 
from selfish ones, such as to bring down oth-
er parties or seek fame, to altruistic ones such 
as protecting colleagues who are victims, or 
to express a commitment to positive change 
from the status quo (Miceli & Near, 1992).
Moral Reasoning
The foundational works for the study of  
moral reasoning were laid by Lawrence Kohl-
berg (Kohlberg, 1971, Kohlberg & Hersh, 
1977) and later refined by James Rest (Rest et 
al., 1999). Kohlberg’s moral theory is the divi-
sion of  six moral development stages which 
are nested into three levels. Firstly, individuals 
at the pre-conventional level interpret moral 
behavior as being based on “the physical or 
the hedonistic consequences of  action … or 
in terms of  the power of  those who enunci-
ate the rules and labels” (Kohlberg & Hersh, 
1977, p. 54). This level comprises of  two 
stages: Stage 1 with “the punishment-and 
obedience orientation” and Stage 2 with “the 
instrumental-relativist orientation.”
Secondly, individuals at the conventional 
level value the family or group’s expectations, 
irrespective of  any direct consequences. The 
conventional level is differentiated into two 
stages: Stage 3, wherein individuals define 
good behavior as “pleasing or helping others 
and is approved by them” (p. 55), and Stage 
4, in which individuals conform in their be-
havior toward “authority, fixed rules, and the 
maintenance of  social order” (p. 55).
Thirdly, the post-conventional level is 
characterized by the transcendence of  moral 
values and principles, beyond or apart from 
the referent groups or persons holding the 
authority. Similar to the previous levels, this 
level is also divided into two stages: Stage 
5 with an emphasis on “social-contract and 
legalistic orientation” in which right action 
is defined in terms of  individual rights and 
standards which have been “agreed upon by 
the whole society” (p. 55), and Stage 6 which 
emphasizes “the universal-ethical-principle 
orientation” in which right action appeals to 
“logical comprehensiveness, universality, and 
consistency” (p. 55).
Individuals’ moral reasoning levels were 
initially investigated through extended, even 
ethnographic, qualitative interviews (Kohl-
berg, 1971). Weber & McGivern (2010) 
developed an instrument to describe mor-
al reasoning in business settings using four 
moral reasoning inventories corresponding 
to Kohlberg’s six stages.1 In particular, stages 
1 and 2 are merged into one inventory due to 
their similarity (as Stage 1 | 2), Stage 3, Stage 
4, and then stages 5 and 6 are combined as 
one inventory (as Stage 5 | 6). They found 
that managers generally converge on Stage 4 
and intent to report wrongdoings when pre-
sented with ethical workplace dilemmas.
Rest (1979) interpreted Kohlberg’s stag-
es by developing a distinct inquiry method, 
called the Defining Issues Test (DIT), to 
1See also Weber (1991).
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score the individual’s moral reasoning into 
higher or lower scores. In contrast to Rest, 
Weber (1991) believed that the moral rea-
soning stages should be understood in terms 
of  the dominant stage across the six stages 
rather than a single score. Xu & Ziegenfuss 
(2008) build on Rest (1979) and incorporat-
ed moral reasoning in their internal auditors’ 
study. They broadly distinguished moral rea-
soning into “high,” “mid,” and “low” and 
found support for the positive relationship 
between the tendency of  whistleblowing 
and the level of  moral reasoning. The re-
sult is also supported in other studies, such 
as Tsui (1996), which compared China and 
USA contexts, and Liyanarachchi & Newdick 
(2009), in New Zealand.
Incentive Schemes
An incentive theory is one of  the main 
motivation theories, which states that behav-
ior is motivated by the desire to get reinforce-
ment or incentives. Two people can act dif-
ferently in the same situation, based on the 
types of  incentives available (Silverman et al., 
2016). Incentives could get people to engage 
in a particular kind of  behavior and action, 
but they could also stop people taking any 
specific actions. Incentives will motivate the 
individual if  he/she views the rewards pro-
vided as essential and the targeted results are 
controllable and realistic.
However, the potential benefits of  link-
ing compensation with performance are rel-
atively straightforward and consistent, but 
some behavioral economists still have doubts 
(Baker et al., 1998). They still see that many 
companies refuse to introduce and use bo-
nus-based compensation schemes. They 
indicate that monetary rewards are counter-
productive. Deci (1972) argued that money 
reduces employee motivation because it re-
duces the meaning of  the intrinsic reward 
that employees receive from their job’s re-
sponsibilities. Similarly, Baker et al., (1998) 
concluded that getting employees to chase 
money will do nothing but encourage people 
to chase money.
Kohn (1988) offered two reasons why 
merit-based payment systems are not effec-
tive. First, incentives can push people to fo-
cus narrowly on a task, do it as quickly as pos-
sible, and take fewer risks. Second, extrinsic 
rewards can erode intrinsic interests so that 
people feel they see themselves as being con-
trolled by gifts. Additionally, while financial 
incentive schemes conceptually increase pro-
ductivity, in practice, they cause a significant 
adverse side effect of  lowering employees’ 
morale and productivity. The dealing costs 
with many of  the problems caused by the 
merit system outweigh the limited benefits to 
the organization. Among the side effects that 
often arise are horizontal equity problems 
and problems associated with imperfect per-
formance measures. Hamner (1975) argued 
that the performance system reduces moti-
vation because managers systematically mis-
manage payroll programs for performance.
Working Relationships
Adkins et al., (1996) indicated that it is 
vital for companies to provide a work envi-
ronment that can promote and encourage 
strong working relationships among employ-
ees, especially in situations where employee 
involvement affects almost every aspect of  
their job. In certain conditions, it will appear 
that employees are not loyal to the company, 
but they are loyal to colleagues with whom 
they have jointly built emotional bonds. Em-
ployees with strong bonds of  friendship are 
more likely to remain loyal to their team, and 
they will also last longer in the company. 
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They will see first-hand that their dedication 
to the team benefits everyone as a whole.
Werbel & Johnson (2001) added that 
satisfaction with the work done provides in-
trinsic motivation for individual employees. 
However, employees who work in teams and 
regularly feel the ups and downs of  contri-
butions and performance achievements will 
prefer their work and even tend to love the 
company. Hence, companies need to make it 
easier for their employees to share the things 
they love about their work and their col-
leagues, to help build stronger bonds.
On the other hand, friends on the same 
work team can also serve as part of  the con-
trol system, which is invaluable when employ-
ees are in a difficult situation. This condition 
allows each employee to leverage and encour-
age his colleagues’ motivation and even cau-
tion them when they act incorrectly (Adkins 
et al., 1996 and Werbel & Johnson, 2001).
Hypotheses Development
Moral Reasoning and Whistleblowing 
Intentions 
Miceli (2004) and Rocha and Kleiner 
(2005) stated that whistleblowing is a unique 
phenomenon because employees face a tough 
choice between prioritizing their loyalty to 
the company or their moral and social obli-
gations to take the right action along with the 
potential personal consequences faced when 
blowing the whistle. In the confusion of  fac-
ing a moral dilemma, many other conditional 
factors come into play before an employee 
decides to report finding fraud. Several stud-
ies have shown that employees are afraid to 
report managers’ fraud because they believe 
that their reports will not be followed up, 
fear that their reports will not be kept secret 
(Verschoor, 2005), or fear retaliation (Rocha 
and Kleiner, 2005). Other studies by Latan et 
al., (2018), Latan et al., (2019a), and Pangestu 
and Rahajeng (2020) provide partial support, 
or no support, for the relationship between 
moral reasoning and whistleblowing .
The behavioral theory indicates that the 
characteristics of  a person’s moral behavior 
can include a desire to help others, a sense of  
empathy, or a feeling of  guilt toward others 
(Rest 1983). Furthermore, Rest (1983) stated 
that moral behavior refers to a moral guide-
line regulating cooperation between humans, 
and is related to the distribution and alloca-
tion of  rights, obligations, and benefits. Many 
studies in this area have concluded that one 
of  the most important factors influencing an 
individual’s decision to blow the whistle is 
their moral behavior (Near and Miceli, 2005). 
Besides, Gundlach et al., (2003) also indicated 
that moral reasoning and retaliation play an 
essential role in the whistleblowing process. 
Specifically, Liyanarachchi & Newdick (2009) 
reported that individuals with a higher moral 
reasoning level were more likely to blow the 
whistle than individuals with a lower moral 
reasoning level. This result is supported by 
Cheng et al., (2019), Dungan et al., (2019), 
Doe et al., (2020), and May-Amy et al., (2020).
In accounting and auditing, as indicated 
by Dozier and Miceli (1985), a person’s ability 
to solve problems or interpret ethical dilem-
mas is influenced by his/her moral reasoning. 
Several other studies, which analyzed the data 
from research samples of  accountants, audi-
tors, or accounting students, have also shown 
that the subjects’ levels of  moral reasoning 
affect their ability to interpret ethical dilem-
mas (Arnold and Ponemon, 1991; Chan and 
Leung, 2006; Uddin and Gillett, 2002). This 
study concludes that a person’s moral reason-
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ing level has a positive effect on his/her eth-
ical behavior. Thus, the following hypothesis 
is formulated.
H1: The higher that the dominant stage of  an indi-
vidual’s moral reasoning is, the more likely he/
she is to blow the whistle.
Incentive Schemes, Working Relation-
ships, and Whistleblowing Intentions
Miceli et al., (2008) suggested that whis-
tleblowing is a multi-level concept with var-
ious predictors. Furthermore, Alleyne et al., 
(2013) proposed a holistic model that cap-
tures institutional-level moderators such as 
organizational support and team norms, 
which moderate individuals’ whistleblowing 
intentions. The model is further implemented 
by Latan et al., (2018). In their study on pub-
lic accountants in Indonesia, organizational 
support and team norms were found to play 
a partial role in improving the relationship 
between individual-level antecedents and the 
intention to blow the whistle. Moreover, Xu 
& Ziegenfuss (2008) compared the effects of  
cash rewards and continuous employment re-
wards on the whistleblowing intention. Their 
findings indicated that reward systems were 
positively related to whistleblowing and that 
cash rewards appealed more to individuals 
with lower levels of  moral reasoning.
In contrast to the incentives strongly ar-
gued to encourage prosocial behavior (Ariely 
et al., 2009, Bénabou & Tirole, 2006), an in-
depth study by Jackson et al., (2010) of  nurs-
es’ workplaces shed essential light on how 
workplace relationships complicate the whis-
tleblowing intention. They found that “ostra-
cism and bullying” as well as the “perceived 
loss of  previously successful relationships” 
(Jackson et al., 2010, p. 41) were among the 
costs of  having engaged in the act of  whis-
tleblowing. In Milliken et al., (2003), these 
social sanctions were reflected as “the fear 
of  being labeled negatively” and the “loss of  
trust and respect” (p. 1462), which foster si-
lence rather than whistleblowing. Included in 
this social reputation is the element of  trust, 
which is established with one’s supervisor.
When group-based work structures 
occur many times in companies, employee 
interactions with co-workers become more 
intense. Companies will support employees 
who are compatible with each other within 
the group because the quality of  their inter-
actions can improve group performance (Ad-
kins et al., 1996 and Werbel & Johnson, 2001). 
This good relationship between co-workers 
will affect a person’s intention to blow the 
whistle in the event of  an ethical violation or 
illegal activity.
Chang et al., (2017), Rehg et al., (2008), 
and Cortina & Magley (2003) showed that 
good relations between colleagues could have 
a different impact on the intention to retali-
ate. When someone has a good relationship 
with their co-workers, there is a tendency that 
they will not criticize each other. In line with 
this concept, it logically makes sense that a 
close working relationship between employ-
ees can reduce the risk perceptions of  ethi-
cal violations or illegal acts, and subsequent-
ly reduce their potential to blow the whistle 
(Wang et al., 2018).
Acknowledging both the incentives and 
workplace relationships, a study by Boo et al., 
(2016) examined the combined effect of  in-
centive systems, in terms of  the incentive (or 
“carrot”) and disincentive (or “stick”), and 
working relationships, in terms of  “close” 
and “‘not close” relationships with a super-
visor. The study found that, while incentive 
systems increased auditors’ likelihood of  
blowing the whistle, having close working 
Supriyadi and Prasetyaningsih
223
relationships weakened the incentives’ ef-
fectiveness. Accordingly, H2 is formulated to 
capture these features.
H2: Individuals exposed to a close working relation-
ship will exhibit a lower likelihood of  blowing 
the whistle than those with no close working re-
lationship.
Many studies in the last decade have 
tested the positive impact of  incentive mech-
anisms on whistleblowing (Pope & Lee 2013; 
Brink et al., 2013; and Xu & Ziegenfuss 2008). 
Pope & Lee (2013), based on experimen-
tal data, documented that financial rewards 
equal to a certain proportion of  employees’ 
salaries can encourage their intention to re-
port superiors who deliberately manipulate 
financial statements. Meanwhile, Brink et al., 
(2013) also indicated that an internal finan-
cial incentive scheme could increase employ-
ees’ intentions to disclose fraud allegations 
to authorities outside the company, based 
upon the existing evidence of  fraud. How-
ever, employees’ tendencies to disclose fraud 
within the company are still higher than the 
tendency to disclose it to authorities outside 
the company. In the realm of  internal audi-
tors, Xu and Ziegenfuss (2008) proved that 
internal auditors have a greater tendency to 
disclose mistakes to their superiors when 
there are financial and non-financial incen-
tives. Similar results are found by Latan et al., 
(2019b) and Andon et al., (2018).
On the other hand, the threat of  punish-
ment schemes did not cause many research-
ers to carry out tests and analyses, especially 
about the intention to do whistleblowing. It 
may occur because whistleblowing interacts 
more with motivational aspects to modify and 
change employee behavior, which contradicts 
the negative sanction scheme (Cortina & 
Magley, 2003). However, Arvey & Ivancevich 
(1980) indicated that although punishment 
schemes have unpleasant connotations, puni-
tive sanctions are a common phenomenon in 
organizations and are adequate to mitigate or 
eliminate unwanted behavior. More than that, 
Trompeter et al., (2014) also suggested that 
punishment schemes can increase the effec-
tiveness of  fraud detection measures such as 
whistleblowing. Accordingly, H3 is formulat-
ed to capture these features.
H3: Individuals exposed to reward incentive schemes 
will show a higher probability of  blowing the 
whistle than those not exposed to such incentive 
schemes.
Joint Effect Hypothesis
A recent study on public accountants in 
Barbados by Alleyne et al., (2018) found that, 
while the individual-level characteristics are 
the main drivers for individuals’ intentions 
to blow the whistle, organizational-level sup-
port acts as a catalyst that amplifies the effect. 
This finding echoes earlier research by Mes-
mer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) in their 
meta-analysis on whistleblowing. They found 
that the organizational climate was strongly 
related to the whistleblowing intention.
Thus, there are two strands to the ar-
gument. On the one hand, individuals with 
higher moral reasoning (Stage 5 | 6) tend to 
be indifferent toward incentives and working 
relationships. On the other hand, an organi-
zational climate that includes workplace rela-
tionships and incentive systems is argued to 
act as an amplifier for individual characteris-
tics such as moral reasoning. Hence, the fol-
lowing hypothesis is proposed.
H4: Individuals with a higher moral reasoning stage 
will find their likelihood of  blowing the whistle 
less affected by working relationships and incen-
tive schemes.
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Figure 1 illustrates the relative posi-
tioning between moral reasoning, incentive 
schemes, and working relationships.
Methods
Experiment Design
This study employed a paper-pencil lab-
oratory experimental method for collecting 
the data. The experimental design was a 2x3 
factorial design between subjects (see Table 
1). The manipulated variables included in-
centive schemes (no incentives, rewards “car-
rot,” and punishment “stick”) and working 
relationships (close and not close). The moral 
reasoning variable was measured using We-
ber & McGivern (2010), with the instruments 
adapted to the Indonesian context.
Participants
The participants used for this study were 
graduate accounting students. In particular, 
they were chosen based on several consider-
ations. Firstly, graduate students are generally 
regarded as being more mature in terms of  
their cognitive stage. It is suggested that most 
individuals’ moral development rarely moves 
to reach the law and order stage (stages 5 and 
6) before reaching their mid-20s (Kohlberg, 
1971).
Second, previous studies suggest that 
people’s moral reasoning tends to deteriorate 
once they enter the world of  work (Della-
portas, 2006, Welton et al., 1994). Thus mea-
suring graduate students’ states of  morality 
could be the best option—compared to un-
dergraduate students—as they should have 
Figure 1. Proposed model of  the whistleblowing intention




“Carrot” “Stick” No Incentive
Working Relationships
Close Scenario C-1 Scenario C-3 Scenario C-5
Not Close Scenario C-2 Scenario C-4 Scenario C-6
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developed cognitively over time, progressing 
to additional moral reasoning levels as they 
matured and obtained a higher education. 
Third, among the graduate students, there 
would be some who have been working and 
some who might have no working experi-
ence. Thus, this situation allows a compari-
son to check any different states of  morality 
between both groups of  students without 
taking another set of  respondents from a 
professional setting.
The participants were invited to par-
ticipate in the experiment through printed 
brochures and social media. Hence, they 
voluntarily took part in the experiment. The 
experiment was run in two batches, and a 
total of  179 students participated in the ex-
periment. The first batch involved 107 partic-
ipants, while the second batch had 72 partici-
pants. Upon completing the experiment, they 
were rewarded with a monetary donation to 
disaster relief  efforts in Indonesia. From the 
collected responses, 80 from the first batch 
and 67 from the second batch of  participants 
passed both the internal consistency check 
for the moral reasoning instrument and the 
manipulation checks for the treatment; thus, 
a total of  147 observations could be used for 
further analysis.
The demographic summary of  the re-
spondents is displayed in Table 2. The re-
spondents comprised 58 males and 89 fe-
males, with 48.30% having work experience 
of  3.8 years on average. Out of  those who 
had work experience, 54.93% had worked 
as accounting staff, and 42.25% had other 
occupations, while two respondents did not 
disclose their previous jobs. None of  these 
demographic variables, i.e., gender, work ex-
perience, and whistleblowing experience, are 
significantly associated with the dependent 
variable. There are no meaningful differenc-
es in the results between male and female 
respondents or between respondents with 
work experience and those without work ex-
perience.
Measurement
The whistleblowing intention was used 
as the dependent variable and measured by 
a continuous scale from 0 to 100. The inde-
pendent variables were: (1) moral reasoning 
stage, (2) incentive schemes, and (3) working 
relationships. According to Weber & Mc-
Givern (2010), the moral reasoning stage was 
measured by asking the respondents to rate 
both the strength and importance of  four 
moral statements (which mirrored the four 
stages of  moral development) in response 
to an ethical dilemma in a business context. 
Additionally, composite scores were created 
for each moral statement to capture the dom-
Table 2. Participants’ demographics
Demographic variable Number of  participants
Total participants 179




With previous work experience 71 (54.93% of  them as accounting staff)
Without previous work experience 76
Mean age 26.42 years
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inant moral reasoning stage. The other two 
independent variables, incentive schemes and 
working relationships, were manipulated us-
ing the instrument used by Boo et al., (2016). 
In alignment with Boo et al., (2016), the pres-
ence (or absence) of  incentive schemes was 
further divided into three manipulations of  
“carrot, stick, and no-incentive.” The close-
ness of  the working relationship, in turn, 
was measured in binary terms (close and not 
close). Additionally, other control variables 
were introduced, such as age, gender, and 
working experience. 
Experimental Procedures and Task
The experiment was done in three stag-
es. In Stage 1, after all the participants were 
randomly assigned to one of  the experi-
mental cells, they were given two scenarios 
to measure their dominant moral reasoning 
stage. They were provided with three differ-
ent ethical dilemma scenarios. The scenarios 
were adapted from the instrument developed 
by Weber & McGivern (2010) from Evelyn 
and Roger’s cases. They were instructed to 
read and complete the tests in a pre-defined 
order. In the first scenario, the participants 
evaluate four statements on a 10-point Likert 
scale concerning the strength of  their beliefs 
for each statement. Afterward, they were re-
quested to rate the importance of  their be-
liefs on each of  the statements using a 5-point 
Likert scale. This procedure was repeated in 
the second scenario. For both scenarios, they 
had 10 minutes to finish each one.
The second stage employed the treat-
ment instrument adapted from the vignette 
used in Boo et al., (2016). The participants 
were given an audit assignment scenario, by 
a large public accounting firm, of  the DEF 
public company’s financial statements, one 
of  the accounting firm’s primary clients with 
material audit fees. In the vignette, the audit 
manager finds misstatements that materially 
overstate company DEF’s earnings and prof-
its. The client company does this to book or 
recognize significant sales transaction reve-
nues prematurely, because their new goods’ 
delivery occurs after the balance sheet’s date. 
However, the DEF company CEO has suc-
ceeded in persuading the partner auditor, the 
audit engagement holder, not to insist on cor-
recting the misstatement of  income. Because 
if  there is a correction, it will be very detri-
mental to DEF, in the form of  violations of  
its bank loan agreements and missing the an-
alyst’s consensus forecast. The audit manag-
er believes that, based on the evidence, sales 
have not been ordered in the financial report-
ing period, so he approaches the partner au-
ditor to voice his concerns. Although the au-
dit manager continued to be concerned, the 
partner auditor insisted on allowing DEF to 
acknowledge sales before the end of  the year, 
so no adjustments were needed.
The participants were informed that the 
public accounting firm has a reporting ho-
tline. The staff  members could report any 
wrongdoing, any lack of  integrity, or ques-
tionable behavior anonymously through an 
online reporting hotline available at any time 
(24 hours a day and seven days a week). The 
reporting system will regulate the reporter’s 
confidentiality by providing a password and 
immediately requiring the reporter to change 
that password with a personal password. The 
reporter can maintain two-way communica-
tion with the company while ensuring their 
anonymity. The accounting firm uses this re-
porting hotline service from an independent 
and reputable ethics hotline service provider. 
All reports will be treated as highly confiden-
tial, and all reported cases will be seriously 
considered and promptly followed up. The 
company will protect the staff  member who 
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makes a report from any form of  retaliation.
After reading the case scenario, the par-
ticipants were asked to assess an auditor’s 
tendency in situations such as those faced by 
the audit manager to report any wrongdoing, 
on a scale ranging from 0 percent (clearly not 
reporting) to 100 percent (certainty report-
ing). The next question was whether he/she 
would report it by ticking the answer option 
“yes” or “no.” The participants were also 
asked to explain the reasons for their assess-
ment briefly.
In the last stage, the participants were 
asked to complete a debriefing questionnaire 
consisting of  demographic data questions 
and a manipulation check. Each item of  ex-
perimental material for these three stages was 
distributed to participants in three envelopes 
stamped A, B, and C, according to the mate-
rial stages. In the beginning, the participants 
were instructed to complete the material se-
quentially, starting from A, B, and C. The par-
ticipants may open envelope B only after they 
have completed and put envelope A’s materi-
al into envelope A. Likewise, envelope C can 
only be opened after they finish and insert 
envelope B’s material into envelope B. The 
scenario in envelope C, in turn, was divided 
into six different stories, which contained a 
combination of  incentive schemes and work-
ing relationships. Four of  the stories were 
randomly distributed to the participants in 
the treatment group. The remaining two sto-
ries, which contained no information about 
incentive schemes, were distributed to the 
control group (Boo et al., 2016).
After completing the first two stages, 
the participants were randomly assigned to 
six experimental cells and given various sce-
narios in envelope C. The participants were 
asked to assess the likelihood of  them blow-
ing the whistle on the perpetrator, based on 
the situation and conditions stated in the sce-
nario, on a continuous scale ranging from 0 
percent (definitely not report) to 100 percent 
(definitely report). Also, the participants were 
required to explain the reason for their deci-
sion briefly. The allocated time for this third 
stage was 15 minutes. Finally, 10 minutes 
were spent completing the debriefing ques-
tionnaire. The experiment needed around 45 
minutes to complete all the tasks.
Results
Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were used to test 
the treatment of  the working relationship and 
incentive schemes variables. For the working 
relationship variable, the participants were 
asked to assess the working relationship be-
tween the audit manager and the audit partner 
before the current audit assignment, using a 
scale ranging from 1 (not close) to 5 (very 
close). The results showed that, as expected, 
the participants in the “close” treatment rat-
ed it as a significantly closer working relation-
ship than those in the “not close” treatment 
did, with an average score of  4.86 and 2.07, 
respectively, with a one-tail p-value of  0.001.
For the incentive scheme’s manipula-
tion, the participants were asked to answer 
two questions. The first question was wheth-
er the public accounting firm had a policy 
that employees who fail to report any wrong-
doing by other employees would be subject 
to sanctions by the company, including being 
terminated. The second question was wheth-
er the public accounting firm had a policy 
that employees who report any wrongdoing 
by other employees would be rewarded by 
the company, including promotion to a high-
er position. Thirty-two participants answered 
the first, second, or both questions incorrect-
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ly and were excluded from the subsequent 
analysis.
Hypotheses Tests
Table 3 Panel A shows that the partic-
ipants converged into two dominant moral 
reasoning stages. Participants in Stage 3 | 4 (n 
= 93) showed a mean propensity to blow the 
whistle of  83.98, with a standard deviation of  
13.64. Whereas participants in Stage 5 | 6 (n 
= 54) showed a mean propensity to blow the 
whistle of  90.29, with a standard deviation 
of  12.02. The mean propensity to blow the 
whistle of  Stage 3 | 4 was significantly lower 
than Stage 5 | 6, at a p-value of  0.024 with a 
t-value of  2.68. This figure indicated that the 
moral reasoning stage had positive effects on 
the propensity to blow the whistle.
Table 3 Panel B shows the mean and 
standard deviation for the propensity to blow 
the whistle based on incentive schemes and 
the working relationship. From the means 
alone, it appears that the working relationship 
and incentive scheme consistently reduced 
the propensity to blow the whistle, with 
means of  89.09 (12.40) vs. 82.75 (13.67) for a 
not close vs. a close working relationship and 
of  82.33 (12.64) vs. 84.62 (11.73) vs. 81.47 
(16.13) for no incentive vs. carrot vs. stick in-
centive schemes. To figure out whether any 
of  these differences were statistically signif-
icant, a three-way ANOVA was performed. 
Table 3 Panel C presents the results.
H1 posits that the higher the dominant 
stage of  an individual’s moral reasoning is, 
the more likely he/she is to blow the whis-
tle. As shown in Table 3 Panel C, the moral 
reasoning stage is statistically significant (F = 
9.27; p = 0.001), producing the difference in 
the propensity to blow the whistle, thus sup-
porting H1. The mean propensity to blow the 
whistle of  moral reasoning Stage 5 | 6 (90.29) 
is positive and significantly higher than Stage 
3 | 4 (83.98), at a p-value of  0.024.
H2, in turn, predicts that a close work-
ing relationship will lower the likelihood of  
blowing the whistle. The result in Table 3 
Panel C shows that the working relationship’s 
main effect significantly affects the propensi-
ty to blow the whistle (F = 4.33; p = 0.041). 
The mean propensity to blow the whistle of  
close relationships is 82.74 (13.67), which is 
significantly lower than that of  not close rela-
tionships, which is 89.09 (12.40) at a p-value 
of  0.046.
H3 projects that individuals exposed to 
incentive schemes will show a higher proba-
bility of  blowing the whistle than those with-
out an incentive scheme. In this respect, the 
main effects of  incentive schemes are mar-
ginally significant (F = 3.64 and p = 0.069); 
thus, support is found for the hypothesis. 
The mean propensity to blow the whistle of  
the carrot incentive is the highest, compared 
to the stick incentive and no-incentive, which 
are 89.24 (11.12), 84.46 (15.52), and 83.41 
(12.23), respectively, at a p-value = 0.017.
Lastly, H4 states that individuals with 
higher moral reasoning stages will find their 
likelihood of  blowing the whistle less affect-
ed by working relationships and incentive 
schemes. No support is found for the inter-
action between the moral reasoning stage, the 
working relationship, and incentive schemes 
(F = 1.46 and p = 0.401). Similarly, the inter-
action between moral reasoning and incen-
tive schemes does not play a significant role 
(F = 1.81 and p = 0.147). No significance is 
found for the interaction between a working 
relationship and incentive schemes (F = 1.41 
and p = 0.344). However, the interaction be-
tween a working relationship and incentive 
schemes is marginally significant, with F = 




This study found that the moral reason-
ing stage played a significant role in increas-
ing the participants’ tendency to blow the 
whistle when facing any wrongdoing in their 
company. These results are consistent with 
the findings of  previous studies (Cheng et al., 
2019; Dungan et al., 2019; Doe et al., 2020; 
May-Amy et al., 2020; Latan et al., 2018; and 
Latan et al., 2020). Individuals with a higher 
level of  moral reasoning have a better abili-
ty to analyze ethical dilemmas and also have 
a higher desire to report fraud than individ-
uals with a lower level of  moral reasoning 
Table 3. Effects of  Moral Reasoning, Incentive Schemes, and Working Relationships on  
Propensity to Blow the Whistle
Panel A. Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of  the effects of  moral reasoning on the propensity 
to blow the whistle
Moral reasoning stage
The propensity to blow the whistle
Mean Std. Dev. Frequency
Stage 3 | 4 83.98 13.64 93
Stage 5 | 6 90.29 12.02 54
Stage 3 | 4 vs Stage 5 | 6 t-value = 2.68 and p-value = 0.024
Panel B. Descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of  the effects of  incentive scheme and working rela-
tionship on the propensity to blow the whistle
Working relationship
Incentive scheme





































Panel C. Analysis of  variance on the propensity to blow the whistle by moral reasoning stage, incentive schemes, 
and working relationships
Source Df F p
Moral reasoning stage 1 9.27 0.001*
Working relationships 1 4.33 0.041**
Incentive schemes 2 3.64 0.069***
Moral reasoning stage’s working relationships 2 3.54 0.035**
Moral reasoning stage’s incentive schemes 3 1.81 0.147
Working relationships’ incentive schemes 2 1.41 0.344
Moral reasoning stage × working relationships × incen-
tive schemes
2 1.46 0.401
*= significant at p < 0.00; ** = significant at p < 0.05; *** = significant at p < 0.10
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(Weber & McGivern, 2010; Liyanarachchi 
& Newdick, 2009; Near & Miceli, 2005; and 
Gundlach et al., 2003). These findings are 
also consistent with the theory of  moral rea-
soning, as documented by Rest (1983), which 
stated that moral behavior refers to and uses 
a moral guideline to regulate cooperation be-
tween humans in realizing responsibilities, 
rights, and benefits.
Similarly, the working relationships sig-
nificantly affected the participants’ tendency 
to blow the whistle; the working relation-
ship’s closeness reduced the participants’ 
probability of  reporting any wrongdoing 
by their colleagues. The results are consis-
tent with the results of  the studies by Boo 
et al., (2016), Latan et al., (2018), and Xu 
Ziegenfuss (2008), who all used the subject 
of  public accountants, and the conclusion 
of  the study by Wang et al., (2018), Chang 
et al., (2017) and Rehg et al., (2008) with the 
subject of  non-accountant managers. How-
ever, this study’s results contradict the study 
results by Adkins et al., (1996) and Werbel & 
Johnson (2001) when the interaction between 
colleagues in the team is very intense. In this 
condition, the working relationship’s close-
ness can increase the tendency to report any 
wrongdoing because their work relationship 
has been very comfortable, and good synergy 
is achieved through their common goals.
The test of  the incentive scheme’s ef-
fects (no-incentives, carrots, and sticks) on 
individuals’ tendency to blow the whistle is 
only marginally supported. In general, these 
results are consistent with the results of  re-
search by Latan et al., (2019b), Andon et al., 
(2018), Rose et al., (2018), Boo et al., (2016), 
Pope & Lee (2013); Brink et al., (2013); and 
Xu & Ziegenfuss (2008), who all found that 
incentive schemes can increase employees’ 
tendencies to blow the whistle. However, this 
study’s marginal support may be because the 
participants have different perceptions of  the 
value between reward and punishment incen-
tive schemes (Boo et al., 2016). It is consis-
tent with the results of  a detailed analysis of  
incentive schemes’ impacts on the propensity 
to blow the whistle. The mean difference in 
the propensity to blow the whistle in the car-
rot cell was significantly higher than that in 
the stick and no-incentives cells, at p = 0.034. 
Simultaneously, the means for the stick and 
no-incentives cells were not statistically dif-
ferent at p = 0.174.
 However, this study’s results do not 
provide sufficient evidence to support the 
moral reasoning stage’s role in strengthening 
individuals’ tendencies to blow the whistle 
when they find any wrongdoing. Although 
the interaction between the working relation-
ship and moral reasoning still had a signifi-
cant effect on individuals’ tendencies to blow 
the whistle (F = 3.54 and p = 0.035), the ex-
istence of  an incentive scheme reduced the 
robustness of  these results. Therefore, the in-
teraction effect of  moral reasoning, working 
relationships, and incentive schemes did not 
increase an individual’s likelihood of  blowing 
the whistle.
The alternative perspective of  why the 
findings did not support the interaction ef-
fect may be caused by the types of  “carrot vs. 
stick” incentives, which could be interpreted 
as opposites. As a result, the close working 
relationship’s negative effect was reduced 
(Wang et al., 2018). Also, a combination of  
“carrot and stick” incentive schemes can re-
duce the working relationship’s moderating 
effect on the tendency to blow the whistle 
(Trompeter et al., 2014). Another plausible 
reason for the lack of  support was discussed 
by Boo et al., (2016), in which they argued that 
“carrot” may impede the propensity to blow 
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the whistle as it can be perceived as harm-
ing others for personal gain. Hence there is a 
canceling effect between the “carrot” incen-
tive scheme and a close working relationship.
Conclusion
This study examined whether moral 
reasoning plays a significant role in strength-
ening the effects of  the working relationship 
and incentive schemes on the tendency for 
whistleblowing when individuals find any 
wrongdoing by their colleagues. Consistent 
with previous studies by Weber and Mc-
Givern (2010), Boo et al., (2016), Latan et al., 
(2018), Pope and Lee (2013), and Brink et al., 
(2013), this study indicates that the simple ef-
fect of  moral reasoning or a close working 
relationship is significant, while an incentive 
scheme is marginally significant for increasing 
the propensity to blow the whistle. Similarly, 
the combination of  moral reasoning and the 
working relationship significantly improves 
the tendency to blow the whistle. However, 
the combined effects of  moral reasoning vs. 
the working relationship and moral reason-
ing vs. the working relationship vs. incentive 
scheme fail to increase the tendency to blow 
the whistle.
 Finally, the moral reasoning stage’s 
role in increasing the participants’ tendencies 
to report wrongdoers is less robust. When a 
close working relationship between the par-
ticipants is presented, moral reasoning is still 
quite robust; however, this role is lost in both 
conditions when the incentive scheme is in-
cluded and when the incentive scheme and 
working relationship are included. It is indi-
cated that the lack of  robustness for the role 
of  moral reasoning is probably due to the na-
ture of  the incentive scheme, which can be 
interpreted as a contradiction between reward 
and punishment, or the working relationship 
between individuals who are too close and 
intimate. Therefore, further research is nec-
essary to consider a more controlled method 
of  manipulating work relationships and in-
centive schemes.
Limitations
Several limitations are pertinent to this 
study. First, the experimental study relies 
solely on the textual scenarios. They may 
not capture the workplace’s complex reality 
and the social interactions embedded in it. 
Second, few conclusions can be made about 
the action of  whistleblowing itself. Whis-
tleblowing is comprised of  a long strand 
of  processes, and the conclusions reached 
in this study should be taken with caution. 
Third, this study uses accounting graduate 
students as its participants. Although no 
difference in the results was found between 
those with and without work experience, it 
will be necessary to research with practicing 
auditors or accountants since they experience 
the daily pressures to comply with the orga-
nization’s norms and methods of  working . 
Fourth, other individual-level attributes that 
are found to influence the whistleblowing in-
tention were not captured and measured in 
this study, such as personal orientation (Park 
et al., 2014) and the personal cost of  report-
ing (Latan et al., 2018; Latan et al., 2019b; and 
Schultz et al., 1993)
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